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NOTES AND COMMENTS ON RECENT
DECISIONS.
INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN STRIKES AGAIN.

In the January number, page 8I, we took occasion to
criticise the action of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Judge Jenkins, for issuing an order which
prohibited the employ6s of a road in the hands of a receiver
from going on a strike. Not having an exact copy of the
injunction before us, we were obliged to rely on other information as to the nature of the injunction. As part of this
information necessarily came through the newspapers, we
designated the source of information, generally, as newspaper
reports. Some of our subscribers, who evidently do not
agree with us in 'our strictures on the injunction, have criticised us for relying" on such meagre authority. We beg to
state, however,, that we took every means in our power to
verify the correctness of our statement as to the nature of the
injunction. We said that its practical effect was to order men
to continue to work. To show that this was no exaggeration,
and also on account of the great importance of the injunction,
we here print one of them in full:
"Whereas, it has been represented to the United States
Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, on
the part of Thomas F. Oakes, Henry C. Payne and Henry
C. Rouse, as receivers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, as by their certain verified petition filed in said cause onl
December i8, 1893, and by their supplemental petition filed
in said cause on December 22, 1893, and that said Thomas
F. Oakes, Henry C. Payne and Henry C. Rouse, as receivers
of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, ought to be
relieved touching the matters in said petitions more particularly described;
"And whereas, the United States Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, in a certain cause there
pending, in which the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company is
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the complainant, and the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
"Philip B_ Winston, William C.- Sheldon, George R. Sheldon,
William S,P. Prentice and William C. Sheldon and Thomas
F. Oakes- and Henry C. Payne and Henry C. Rouse, as
receivers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, are
defendants, did make orders directing that the writ of injunc-.
tion issue as prayed for in said petition and supplemental
_petition of said receivers;
"Now, therefore, in consideration thereof, and of the matters
in said petition set forth, you, the above named and the
officers, agents and employ6s of Thomas F. Oakes, Henry
C. Payne and Henry C. Rouse,, as receivers of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, and the engineers, firemen, trainmen, train dispatchers, telegraphers, conductors, switchmen,.
.and all other employ~s of said Thomas F. Oakes, Henry C.
Payne and Henry C. Rouse, as receivers ,of the Northern
Pacific Railroad -Company, and each and "every one of you,
and all persons, associations and combinations, voluntary or
otherwise,.ivhether employ~s of said receivers or not, and all
persons generally, -and each- and every one of you, in the
penalty which may ensue, are hereby strictly charged and
commanded that you, and each and every of you, do absolutely desist and refrain from disabling or rendering in any
wise unfit for convenient and immediate use any engines, cars
or other property of Thomas F. Oakes, Henry C. Payne and
Henry C. Rouse, as receivers for the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company, and from interfering in any manner with the lossession of locomotives, cars or property of the said receivers
or in their custody, and from interfering -in any manner, by
force, threats or otherwise, with men -who desire to continue
in the service of the said receivers, and from interfering in any
manner, by force, threats or otherwise, with men employed .by
the said receivers to take the place of those who quit the
service of said receivers, or from interfering with or obstructing in any wise the operation 6f the railroad or any portion
thereof, or the running of engines and trains thereon and
thereover, as usual, and from any interference with the tele.graph lines of said receivers or along the lines of railways
-
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operated by said receivers, or the operation thereof, andfrm'
combining and conspiring to quit, with or without notice, the
service of said receivers, with the object and intent of cripplingthe property in their custody, or embarrassing the operation of
saidrailroad,andfrom so quitingthe service of the saidreceivers,
with or without notice, as to cripple the property or to prevent or
hinder the operation of said railroad,and generally from interfering with the officers and agents of said receivers or their
employts, in any manner, by actual violence or by intimidation, threats or otherwise, in the full and complete possession
and management of the said railroad, and of all the property
thereunto pertaining, and from interfering with any and all
property in the custody of the said receivers, whether
belonging to the receivers or shippers, or other owners, and
from interfering, intimidating, or otherwise injuring or inconveniencing or dela~ing, the passengers being transported, or
about to be transported, over the railway of said receivers, or
any portion thereof by said receivers, or by interfering in any
manner, by actual violence or threats, or otherwise preventing
or attempting to prevent the shipment of freight or the
transportation of the mails of the United States over the road
operated by said receivers, and .from combining or conspiringtogether, or with others, either jointly or severally, or as
committees, or as officers of any so-called labor organivation,
with the design orpurpose of causing a strike upon the lines of
railroadoperatedby said receivers, and from ordering, recommending, approving or advising others to quit the service of the
receivers of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company on January
r, 1894,or at any other time, and from ordering,recommending
advising or approving, by communication, or instruction, or
othervise, the employis of said receivers, or any of them, or of
said Northern Pacific Railroad Company, to join in a strike on
said January r, 1894, or at any other time, and frQm ordering,
recommending or advising any committee or committees, or class
or classes of employi's of said receivers, to strike or join in a
strike, on January r, z894, or at any other time until the
further order of this Court."
(Signed)
EDWARD KURTZ, Clerk.
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If the words printed in italics in the above injunction do not
prevent the employ~s from leaving the employ of the receiver,
end practically, in effect, to keep them at Work under the
present wages and conditions, we are unable to read the
English language.
We have said all that we care to say on this subject from a
legal toint of view in the January number above referred to.
We hope,however, to be able, in the March number of the
Magazine, to print a defence of the action of the Court by an
eminent lawyer, whose'belief that the injunction is sotind is as
strong as ours is that it is not.
W. D. L,

EXECUTOR'S POWERS TO TRANSFER SHARES.

The decision in Livezey v. The Northern Pacific Railroad,
33 W.N.C. 126 (Pa.), deserves notice. It opens a running sore
that we all thought had -been healed.
It rules that an executor cannot transfer personal property
of the testator after six years. from the death Without a decree.
-Itevidently assumes that if the will creates a trust the executor
is not only converted -into a trustee, not merely.as between
himself and the cestui que trust, which is true after administration is completed, though-not till then (6 Madd. 13), or when
he assents to the legacy (42"Ch. Div. 302), but also that a
trust arises without any act to ascertain that the duties' of
administration are completed, and the title to the property as
trustee is ascertained, which it is submitt6d, is a very serious
mistake. Evidently, no distinction between these very different
things is noticed in the case.
The point deserving of notice on this point of.law is the
tendency to ignore well settled rules and avoid decisions
without even a remark so that the profession is left in doubt
whether the rules and decisions were unknown or are intentionall ' overruled.
In 1796, the very case, identical in every-material fact, was
before Lord Eldon, in Hartga v. The Bank of England,
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3 Ves. 33, the material fact being far stronger, however, in
favor of the present contention.
In the judgment under consideration, it is said after six
years there could be no occasion for a transfer by the
executor. In that case the testatrix died in 1778, and the
question was whether the bank could, in 1793, fifteen years
afterwards, demand evidence of the right of an executor to
transfer, or be called to account for having allowed a transfer,
the stock being specifically devised in trust and there being in
fact no dispute about the trust.
All the arguments presented in Livezey v. The Railroad
were there presented and a good many more. The decision
was that the bank had no business to inquire, why an executor
transferred stock. That the fact that it was given in trust had
nothing whatever to do with the question. The judgment
well deserves reading. It has never been questioned by any
one, who was aware of its existence, and it never could be
questioned by any one who understands what an executor is,
as to the outside world. The reasons are unanswerable and
the rule has remained to this day.
But it may be said, all this amounts to nothing, for there is
no reason why we should not have the right to make new law
for ourselves. But (I) it is not pretended and it could not be
that there has been any legislation. (2) It is not pretended
that there has been any judicial recognition of any change in
the law or any divergence between the system of our ancestors
and ours. On the contrary, in the very judgment from which
there is a long quotation, the purpose of which it is difficult, if
not impossible, to see there is a most emphatic endorsement of the law as laid down in Hartga v.The Bank, and a
flat contradiction of the law as now stated. Whether the case
was unknown or unread may be debated. But one would
think that such a passage as this would induce-inquiry in one
citing an authority for the point, that a transfer clerk is liable
for permitting a transfer of shares by an executor, on reading,
that it is undoubted law that he isnot. The material passage
which is not quoted is this:
"The law casts the legal ownership of personal property of
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"a'deceased intestate upon his administrators. They are
"sometimes said to be trustees, but they are such for adminis"tration. .Their .primary duty always is to dispose of the
"personal property, and therewith pay the debts of the intestate
"and make distribution amongst his text of. kin. A sale and
"transfer of stocks by them is therefore in the line of their
"duty. Their is no cestui que trust having a right to interfere
"and prevent such a transfer. Hence, letters of administra"tion are always sufficient evidence of authority . . and so,
"generally does'an executor. His primary duty is "adminis"tration.' He is to pay debts and legacies out of the personal
"estate, and use even specific legacies to pay- debts if
His letters. testamentary, therefore, show an
"necessary.
"apparent right to dispose of the stocks of the testator; even
"if the stock has been bequeathed specifically, a transfer agent
"has no means of ascertaining whether it is needed to pay
":debts. He can inquire only of the executor, the very person
"who proposes to make the transfer. If he inquire of the
"specific legatee he dan -learn nothing, for the legatee may be
"ignorant, and to require evidence of authority beyond the
"letters testamentary might greatly delay and embarass the
"executor in the discharge of his duties. It has, therefore,
"generally been held that transfer agents may safely permita
"transfer of stock .by an ex'ecutor without' looking for his
"authority beyond his letters. Such was the ruling in Hartga
Mv. The Bank of England, 3 Ves. 55; Bank of England
"v. Parsons, 5 id. 665; Same v..Same, 15 id. 569; Franklin v.
"The 'Bank; 9 B. & C. I56; -Fowler v. Churchill, and
"Churchill

v. The Bank, I I M. & W. -323,; and Bank. v.

"Franklin, i Russell Ch. 575." Similar decisions have been
made in this. country, and so far the law is undoubted.
The apparent forgetfulness of the Act of 1874, .intended to
protect transfer agents, induced an examination of the paper
book. And who would suspect from the judgment that the
Court was not dealing with a -case with which the law of
Pennsylvania had nothing to do. And this explains the
palpable contradiction between this case and. that of .Fezmeyer
v. Shannon.
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The citation of Chew v. The Bank, is an odd one and
induces the suspicion it was at second hand. No point was
there raised as to the power of an executor to transfer, and it
is for this it is cited. It was, did the consent of one known to
be an idiot, and so found, warrant a transfer of his (the idiot's
property) by an executor to himself?
But the purpose of this paper is simply to show that a
considerable decision has been so cited as to make it appear
to be the exact reverse of what it was, and that this has opened
the flood gates of litigation about a question so simple as the
right of executors and administrators to transfer stock, and of
the duty of transfer clerks to sit as Chancellors, but always ex
.parte,and at the risk of their employers on that question.
R. C. McM.
SOME EQUITY CASES.

There have been some recent decisions in the department
of equity which.possess more than a passing interest, though
it would be entirely too much to say that they are in any
way remarkable. The peculiar characteristic of equity jurisprudence, it must be remembered, is its creative faculty and,
as has been well said by an eminent jurist, "if we want to
know what the rules of equity are we must look, of course
rather to the more modern than to the more ancient cases."
And the equity lawyer must, therefore, not only read the
current decisions in his branch of jurisprudence, but should
also examine them closely, for its progressiveness is generally
written in minute characters which are undecipherable, if once
the sequence is broken.
It is proposed, therefore, to illustrate the different principles
of equity by the citation of selected cases with a short discussion whenever a particular case seems to require more than
ordinary attention.
Resulting Trusts..
Where one agrees to buy and hold certain real estate for
the joint benefit of himself and another, and does in fact
purchase it, a resulting trust arises which is not within the
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statute of frauds; and which may be established by the evidence of the cestui que trust and by the admission of the
trustee that he. originally intended to buy for their joint
benefit.- And, in this case, the effect of this admis'sion was
not affected by the fact that it included a statement by the
purchaser that he changed his mind before he bought the
property, inasmuch as it appeared that he did not notify the
cestui que trust of his changed intention: Towle v. Wadsworth
(Ill. Sup. Ct.), 35 N. E. Rep. 73.
This decisiori was on a rehearing of the case and overrules
the decision of MAGRUDER, C. J., reported in 30 .N. E. Rep.
6o2. The latter decision was based upon the Court's view
that the evidence to establish the alleged loan was not full and
satisfactory enough, a view which BAILEY, C. J., on the
rehearing considered erroneous. The principle, however, is a
familiar one: See Kimmel v. Smith, 117 Pa. 192 (1887), and
.Hackney v. Butt, 41 Ark. 393.
Trustees.
The obligation of each co-trustee to see that the duty of
their office is properly .discharged is well shown in the case of
Purdy v. Lynch, 25 N. Y. Sup. 585. Certain land was conveyed in trust to three trustees to sell for the payment of
debts and to reconvey the surplus to the- grantor. Two of
the trustees practically turned over the proceeds of the sale
to their associate to pay off the debts, and he misapplied the
funds. The Court held that the others were liable tor a
breach of duty for failing to attend t6 it, that" he applied the
money as provided for in the trust agreement.
Jurisdiction.
The case of Englin et al. v. Wheeler (Sup. Ct., Ala.), 13 So.
Rep. 473, illustrates the gcope of the general jurisdiction of
equity jurisprudence. From the facts it appeared that a judgment had been rendered against a decedent in his lifetime,
-which, by the provisions of the code, became a lien upon his
estate for a certain period after his death. "But,through delay
in issuing execution, the creditor found himself without any
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statutory remedy for the enforcement of his lien. Upon
application to a court of equity, however, the required relief
was granted. After stating that there was no original jurisdicdiction in courts of law to enforce liens, the Court proceeded,
" in the absence of statutory provisions conferring the remedy
upon a court of law to enforce a lien created by the statuteand no other mode is provided by statute-a court of equity
by virtue of its general jurisdiction :ver liens and trusts will
take jurisdiction and enforce the lien."
Injunctions.
The power of a court of equity to enjoin the breach of
negative covenants where expressed in a contract has been
unquestioned since the decision in Lumley v. Wagner. But
cases are continually arising where the contracts call for
personal services and there is no covenant not to perform them
for others, and the courts have enforced such contracts by
injunction, on the ground that the services are special and
unique. It is probable that the current of decision in this
country will ultimately set that way. In a recent case in
Georga it appeared that an insurance agent had assigned to a
firm his interest in a contract of agency, and had covenanted
to remain with the firm as special agent, in a named State, for
one year, and to give his entire time and attention to soliciting
business for that company. He began soliciting business for a
rival company and his covenantee endeavored to enjoin him
from so doing. The Court was of opinion, however, that it
could not grant the relief prayed for, since there was no express
negative covenant in the assignment, and it did not appear that
the defendant was an especially skilful, successfulor ex ert agent,
whose place could not be readily and adequately supplied by
another: Burney v. Ryle, 17 S. E. Rep. 986.
See, on this point, Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward,
24 Abb. N. C. 393.
R. P.

BRADFORD.

SOME CASES ON TORTS.

Two cases recently decided in the

Supreme

Court of
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Pennsylvania will serve to show the limits there set to the
master's duity to instruct his servants in the managemeut of
novel machinery and implements, and to inform them of a
danger necessarily connected therewith, which is unknown to
such servants.
In Lebbening v. Struthers, Wills & Co., 157 Pa. 312The company was held responsible for an injury to one
servant, resulting from the unskilfulness and neglect of a
fellow servant, who was engaged with him in the management
of a piece of iachinery, whose nature and .Character had not
been sufficiently pointed out to them by the foreman in
control of their work. Both workmen were unacquainted with
the manner of working the machine. It was there stated to
be the positive duty of the roaster, before putting an inexperienced employ6 in charge of dangerous machinery, with the
use of which -he is unacquainted, to pro5erly instruct and
qualify him for such new service. •If he does not do so.
himself he must remain responsible for the manner in which
the person, to.whom he has delegated the work of instruction,
performs it. The master, can not clear himself by showing
that he selected for the performance of his duty a person, to
the best of his knowledge, competent and trustworthy. To
this extent the subordinate is the "vice-principal." In this
case it will be noted that the person injurdd was not injured
solely by the danger inherent in the nature of the machine of
which he was unwarned, but by that combined with the
unskillfulness of a fellow workman, produced by the lack of
that instruction, which it was the master's' duty to give
him, not only for his own safety but for ihat.of all those whomight be harmed by his lack of skill.
This duty to warn workmen of danger and instruct them in
the management of their machines only extend to those who.
obviously lack experience. Thus, in Burrows v. Pa. & N. Y.
Canal and R. R. Co., 157 Pa. 5', decided just before the
above case, it was held that, wvhere the railroad allowed the.
engiies of another road to run upon their line, they were not
bound to warn such of their own engineers as might be put in
charge of those engines of the somewhat greater width, which,.
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taken in connection with the width of the bridges, etc., on the
line, might be a source of danger, inasmuch as he was an
experienced engineer and more likely to know of the dangerous nature of the route than any other employ6 of the
company. The former case shows the true meaning of the
term vice-principle, when used in the Pennsylvania cases. It
means one to whom the master has delegated the performance
of some positive duty laid by the law upon him, and for the
proper performance of which he is answerable just as much
when he so delegates it as when he undertakes its performance
himself. In sharp contrast to this meaning of vice-principal is
that adopted by the Supreme Court of Washington, which is
applied in the recent case of Morgan v. Carbon Hill Coal Co.,
34 Pac. Rep. 152, in which following the federal decisions (R.
R. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, etc.), it was said, that test as to
whether one employ6 was a fellow servant of another or a
vice-principal for whose conduct the master was responsible,
depended upon whether or not the one servant had the power
of control over the other. There, it was held that a fire boss,
who had only the power to order the miners from one place
to another, was not vice-principal but a fellow servant with a
miner who was injured by the fire boss' negligence in lighting
his pipe where there was fire damp, and so causing an
explosion. He had no control over their work or their
manner of conducting it. Had, however, the injury resulted
from the act of the fire boss in ordering the miners into a
place of danger the company would be liable. Where a
limited power of control is given the company is only liable
for a misuse of that power. Where authority over workmen
is conferred by the master he must be liable for the mode in
which it is exercised. Such is the definition of vice-principal in
that case. The distinction between the two meanings is clear,
the one describes a subordinate in what so ever grade of
service to whom is delegated the performance of some positive
duty which the master, at his hazzard, is bound to see performed, the other one to whom the master has given authority
to control the movement and actions and work of other
employ6s.
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case of
In re Coleman's Estate, 28 At. Rep. I37, has consistently
carried out the principle of the decision in Miller's Ap., i i i
Pa. 321,. recognizing the liability of foreign real estate owned
by a Pennsylvania testator, to the collateral inheritance tax
law, where the owner has, by his will, effected an equitable,
conversion with respect to such real estate. In Coleman's
Estate the converse of this question was presented. A nonresident testator directed his executor to sell certain real estate.
situate in Pennsylvania, covert the same into money and pay
certain legacies to collaterals. It was held that the assessment
of the land, as land, for the payment of the collateral inheritance tax was void,"inasmuch as the testator willed only the
proceeds of a sale of such lands to collaterals.
In former pages we have called attention to some peculiarities of this branch of our collateral inheritance tax law,
Thus, in Miller's Appeal, the tax was imtpose'd upon a fund arising from the sale of foreign real estate, owned by a domestic
testator, with respect to which he had effected an equitable
conversion.
'"As the order to sell was imperative and
absolute," said the court, "and worked a conversiofn . . . we
"have no choice to regard it as other than personalty. As
"such it must be regarded as passing by the law of the
"domicile."
In commenting upon this decision, it was observed that
the notion that real estate and everything pertaining to its
devolution, transmission and tenure was governed 'and
controlled by the lex rei sitcs had been settled -by a long line
of authorities: Bigelow's Story's Conf. pf Laws (8th Ed.).
To charge the succession of foreign real estate with the
payment of the collateral inheritance tax is inconsistent with
the spirit of such taxation. Land situate abroad and devised
by a domestic will, does not devolve by force of the will nor
of the domestic law, but by permission of the State where the
land is situate; and, not depending upon the domestic law,
cannot legally nor in good conscience be asked to pay the price
of succession: In re Swift's Estate, 32 N. E. Rep.. io96; 32
Am. L. R. and Rev. 367; Bittinger's Appeal, 129 Pa. 338.
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In the opinion of the Orphans' Court in Coleman's Estate
we have the following explanation of Small's Appeal, 151 Pa. I :
"The bequest was specifically of testator's (who was
domiciled in Maryland) interest, including 'all the property,
real and personal, notes, stocks, bonds, and accounts,' in a
limited partnership organized under the laws, and having its
principal place of business in this State. The value of the
property depended largely upon its continuance here. There
was no reason for its conversion and transmission to the
testator's domicile, and it was given to the surviving partners
as such in specie. The fdcts plainly made an exception to the
general rule. The actual situs was here, and liability to the
tax followed. It is urged upon behalf of the commonwealth
that. this case rules the present. But the facts differ in
material respects. The gift here was of an interest in a fund
whose distribution belonged to the domicile of the donor. It
was said in Re Bittinger's Estate, 129 Pa. 338, I8 Atl. 132,
that the collateral inheritance tax was not a succession, but a
direct tax upon the 'thing' given in the hands of the donees.
What was the 'thing' given to these legatees? The answer is
in Miller v. Com., I I I Pa. 321; 2 Atl. 492, in which it was
held that, where a testator, domiciled in this State, orders
land, situated without, to be sold to pay pecuniary legacies,
these legacies will pass to the legatees as money, subject to
the domicillary law, and, consequently, to the collateral inheritance tax. 'Under all the decisions it cannot be questioned,'
said the court, 'that the third clause of [sale under the] will
operated a conversion of the residuary real estate into personalty, efficacious from the moment of testator's death."
These cases, certainly, appear remarkable from the writer's
stand point. A fiction of equity, which, for the purpose of
better effecting the intention of a testator, regards land as
personalty and personalty as land, seems capable of bringing
Pennsylvania real estate into New Jersey, and vice versa, for the
purpose of taxation.
JOHN A. McCARTHY.

